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Abstract— Android Malware has emerged as a consequence of
the increasing popularity of smartphones and tablets. While most
previous work focuses on inherent characteristics of Android
apps to detect malware, this study analyses indirect features
and meta-data to identify patterns in malware applications.
Our experiments show that: (1) the permissions used by an
application offer only moderate performance results; (2) other
features publicly available at Android Markets are more relevant
in detecting malware, such as the application developer and
certificate issuer, and (3) compact and efficient classifiers can
be constructed for the early detection of malware applications
prior to code inspection or sandboxing.
Index Terms— Google Play meta-data; Android Malware;
malware detection; Feature Hashing; Machine Learning; Data
Analytics.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The mobile market industry has explosively grown in the
last decade. According to latest estimates, the number of
smartphone users has reached 2 billion at the beginning of
2014, and is expected to grow up to more than 2.50 billion in
2018 1.
Android has positioned itself as the leading operating sys-
tem in the Smartphone industry, accounting for more than
86.8% of devices by the end of 20162. Indeed, one key
for its success is that the Android platform is open to any
developer, individual or enterprise, who is able to easily design
new applications and services and upload them to any of
the Android markets available, namely Google Play Store,
Amazon Appstore, Samsung Galaxy Apps, etc. At the time
of writing, it is estimated that nearly 2.7M applications are
uploaded at Google Play, while new applications are uploaded
at a pace of more than 60k per month3.
Unfortunately, the popularity of Android and its ease for
develop and upload any app has side effects. In this light,
Android has become one of the most valuable targets for
malware developers. An extensive taxonomy of Android mal-
ware applications, where up to 49 malware families have been
identified, can be found in [1].
1See: http://www.emarketer.com/Article/
2-Billion-Consumers-Worldwide-Smartphones-by-2016/
1011694, last access Nov 2016
2See http://www.idc.com/prodserv/
smartphone-os-market-share.jsp, last access Mar 2017
3See http://www.appbrain.com/stats/
number-of-android-apps, last access Mar 2017
The ability to early detect malicious Android applications
is vital to enhance user security, since Android apps can
be tagged, reported and removed from the market and their
signatures blacklisted. This is a classification problem and,
therefore, many authors have attempted the application of
machine learning to different feature sets.
Consequently, machine learning has been profoundly stud-
ied, and a survey of techniques may be found in [2]. For
instance, the authors in [3] gather features from application
code and manifest (permissions, API calls, etc) and use
Suport Vector Machines (SVMs) to identify different types
of malware families. The authors in [4] analyse bayesian-base
machine learning techniques for Android malware detection.
In [5], the authors use permissions and control flow graphs
along with Suport Vector Machines (SVMs) to differentiate
malware from good applications (”goodware” in what fol-
lows). The authors in [6] uses API calls and permissions as
features to train SVMs and Decision Trees. Androdialysis [7]
explores the intents of each application as features for the
classification task. Yerima et al [8] try different algorithms
over API calls and command sets and shows promising results
for ensemble methods, such as random forest.
In general, Android permissions have been extensively stud-
ied under the assumption that these are critical in identifying
most malware, see [9], [10], [11], [12]. Actually, in [9]
the authors show that malware uses less permissions than
goodware.
The authors in [13] attempt to detect malware by inspecting
other application run-time parameters, such as CPU usage,
network transmission and process and memory information.
Mas’ud et al [14] also include Android system calls into
analysis. Furthermore Elish et al [15] propose a single-feature
classification system based on user behaviour profiling. Droid-
chain authors [16] propose a novel model which analyses
static and dynamic features of applications assuming different
malware models.
In a different approach, the authors of [17] design a
differential-intersection analysis technique to identify repack-
aged versions of popular applications, which is a common way
to disguise malicious applications, showing good performance.
Concerning malware detection systems, there exists two
main trends: (1) online services which aim to provide efficient
and lightweight solutions to cope with malware detection from
the mobile device and (2) offline services to engage in fast
2analysis of enormous amounts of applications in order to
mark potentially harmful code, either for removal or extended
inspection. In this light, several authors have explored both
trends, obtaining results such as the systems exposed in [3],
[18], [19] which provide online solutions to inform or warn
the user on the device or more general, hardware-dependent
systems such as [20], [21] which are huge scalable systems
capable of dealing with huge amounts of applications at once,
enabling fast and cheap detection mechanisms for entities like
application markets to improve the quality of their apps. [22]
surveys extensively the types and works regarding malware
detection system.
In addition, obtaining as much information as possible on
threats and other undesired applications is really necessary, and
various authors propose methodologies and systems to collect
diverse and huge amounts of data. For example, Burguera et
al [23] propose a framework for collecting application trace
and identify uncommon behaviours of common applications.
Moreover, the authors of [24], [25] propose a system to gather
signatures and malware information automatically.
In fact, a good deal of information is already available at
Google Play and can be used to identify patterns not yet
pointed out in previous work. Elements like developer name,
categories or votes have not been used to the best of our knowl-
edge in malware detection yet. Such meta-data provides a good
starting point to develop a lightweight malware detector which
does not require performing behaviour analysis and provides
a fast first-stage notion on whether an application ”behaves
suspiciously” (shows malware patterns) or not. However, very
few studies have analysed any subset of this information:
only the authors of [26] performed sentiment analysis on the
comments made by users regarding Android applications.
To this end, this work focuses on the analysis of such
indirect features and their ability to unveil malware. We
analyse meta-data to find only a subset of features which
have proven predictive power and use them to develop and
test different machine learning models.
The remainder of this work is organised as follows: Sec-
tion II describes the dataset under study, including number
of applications and types of features analysed. Section III is
explains to the methodology, whereas section IV reports the
experiments and results obtained. Finally, section V concludes
this work with a summary of the findings.
II. DATASET DESCRIPTION AND PRE-PROCESSING
The dataset used in this study comprises around 140K
Android applications collected from Google Play Store dur-
ing 2015. This dataset has been obtained using the Tacyt
cyber-intelligence tool developed internally at Eleven Paths
(Telefo´nica Group, see Acknowledgements for further details).
For each application, we have extracted not only intrinsic
features of the Application PacKage File (apk), e.g. size
in bytes or list of permissions used, but also other meta-
data available at Google Play, including that related to the
application developer or the number of votes or average star
rating. Some of these features are numeric (e.g. application
size, average rating), while others are categorical (e.g. whether
an application belongs to a certain category or not). Next
section overviews the features derived from such data, some
of them will reveal extremely powerful in identifying potential
malware.
A. Intrinsic application features
These relate to concise application information, including
its size (bytes), application category, number of images and
files used by the application, etc. This group comprises 15
features.
Other intrinsic features considered in the analysis include
the permissions used by each apk. There are over 29K different
permissions used by the applications in our dataset; most
popular ones are:
• android.permission.internet (found in 96.07% of apps)
• android.permission.access network state (91.15%)
• android.permission.read external storage (54.5%)
• android.permission.write external storage (54.12%)
• android.permission.read phone state (39.81%)
Many permissions appear only once in the dataset as
they are often self-defined permissions. Thus, the binarized
permission features comprise a very-sparse high-dimensional
matrix. In these cases, feature hashing [27] is an effective
strategy for dimensionality reduction; it works by grouping
applications according to some hash functions. We will lever-
age the hashing trick in the paper to increase the number
of Intrinsic application features in a smaller number that just
adding permissions as they are.
B. Social-related features
These are 7 features and involve feedback collected from
users in the market. As Google Play is strongly connected with
the social network Google+, features like total number of votes
or average rating are provided. For each possible ratings (1,
2, 3, 4 and 5 stars) we acquire the number of votes given.
Then, it is possible to easily compute the mean average of
any application in the market as well as the total number of
votes for that application.
C. Entity-related features: Developers and Certificate Issuers
Android markets often provide information about the appli-
cation developers (name, email address, website, etc), and the
certificate information of the application signature (expedition
or expiration dates, issuer or subject names, etc).
Within data, there are around 45K different developer names
and 40K certificate issuer names. Following [28], we have
created two new features called developerRep and issuerRep
which account for the percentage of applications that each
developer and certificate issuer have tagged as malware. The
reader must note that Google Play allows self-signed appli-
cations, i.e. applications where the issuer is the same as the
developer.
As a result, in many cases, the issuer of a certificate and the
developer may be the same entity. However, their reputations
may change, as many issuers may not only sign their own
applications and not all developers self-sign their applications
(and even if they do, they use different accounts)
3D. Malware detection attributes
Once downloaded, all applications have been inspected
for malware using the VirusTotal web service (free Online
Virus, Malware and URL Scanner, available at: http://
www.virustotal.com/, last access Feb 2017). VirusTotal
checks each application against a large number of malware
engines, producing a binary result (malware/goodware) per
engine (McAfee, AVG, VIPRE, TrendMicro, etc.). In our
dataset, around 50% of the applications have been declared
as malware by at least one of these engines.
Concerning the number of detectors per malware appli-
cation, a zipf-like behaviour is observed, i.e. most malware
applications are only detected by a single antivirus (AV)
engine, while a few number of malware applications are
detected by many AV engines. In particular, 25% of the
malware applications are detected by 1 AV engines or less (1st
Quartile), 50% are detected by 2 AV engines or less (median)
and 75% malware applications are detected by 4 AV engines
or less (3rd Quartile). We shall use the label ”isMalware”
(TRUE/FALSE) to denote whether an application is tagged
as Malware or not.
Fig. 1
HISTOGRAM OF AV DETECTORS PER MALWARE APPLICATION.
Fig. 1 shows in a histogram the frequency of each appli-
cation detection count. The zipf-like behaviour is clear in the
picture, as most applications are only detected by a single
engine (34,025 applications), while the average detection count
is 3. Furthermore, there is one application detected as malware
by 53 AV detectors.
Due to this disparity and disagreement among AVs, we will
consider the aforementioned quantiles (1,2 and 4 detections)
as different thresholds to establish ground truth rules within
the detection scheme.
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS
A. Initial approach
Feature selection is key to reduce complexity and improve
performance. We expect some features to have more predictive
power than others, as noted in Fig. 2. In this figure, three
boxplots for malware/goodware classes are shown for three
sample features: the number of times the application has been
downloaded from the market (left), the time the application
has been in Google Play (centre) and the developer reputation
(right).
As observed, downloads is not a very useful feature,
since both goodware and malware show similar 25-percentile
(around 10) as well as 75-percentile (48), values. Concerning
the number of days in Google Play (centre), the 25-, 50-
and 75- quantile measures of malware differ from goodware,
showing some predictive power. Finally, developers reputation
(right) clearly reveals that malware developers tend to develop
more malware while goodware developers create almost no
malware.
B. Classification models and performance evaluation
In a binary classification problem, we are often given a
training set with labeled data {Xi, yi}Ntri=1, where yi ∈ {0, 1}
and Xi is a vector containing the values of P predictors or
features, namely, Xi = (xi1, . . . , xiP ). In our case, the labels
y refer to the categoric variable ”isMalware”, whereas the
predictors Xi comprise 512 feature hashes of permissions, 15
intrinsic features, 7 social-related features and reputations.
Machine-Learning algorithms are in charge of constructing
a function g(X) from the training set that separates the two
classes with minimum error. In our experiments, we have used
Logistic Regression (LR), Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
and Random Forests (RF) as three well-known supervised
learning algorithms
Once a model is obtained, the following stage consists on
testing its ability to predict the result of unobserved data
samples, i.e. evaluate the model’s generalisation capabilities.
Ten-fold cross-validation has been used to adjust resulting
models and evaluate test error, with well-known metrics:
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves and the Area
Under ROC Curve (AUC-ROC), Precision, Recall and F1-
score.
It is worth recalling that the ROC curve compares the False
Positive Rate (FPR) vs True Positive Rate (TPR), and the AUC
measures the integral of the ROC curve, being unity the highest
possible value. In addition, Precision measures how many
of the applications tagged as malware are indeed malware,
while Recall measures how many true malware applications
the model detects from the total. In other words:
Prec =
TP
TP + FP
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
where (TP, FP, TN, FN) refer to True/False Positive/Negative
respectively. Finally, the F1-score trades off precision and
recall by computing their geometrical mean.
1) Validation and Significance: Ten-fold cross-validation
consists on splitting the entire dataset in 10 chunks of equal
size and perform 10 iterations over them, selecting at each
turn a different chunk to be the testing set and the reminding
ones to be the training. Using this method, one can perform
hyper-parameter tuning, but also provide results with statistical
significance (i.e. robust results which do not depend on the
selection of training/test instances).
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Fig. 2
GOODWARE/MALWARE BOXPLOT COMPARISON FOR THREE FEATURES:NUMBER OF DOWNLOADS, NUMBER OF DAYS SINCE THE APPLICATION WAS
UPLOADED AND DEVELOPER REPUTATION
C. Feature selection
Some features are critical in the discrimination between
good/malware while others are not, either due to correlation
or small predictive power. For selecting from those features,
we have used the following methods:
1) Pearson’s Chi Squared test: Statistical test used to
determine whether any difference among variables occurs by
chance or there is indeed a statistical relation.
2) Entropy-based methods: In information theory, entropy
measures the amount of unknown information a certain source
provides. The following measurements are considered:
• Information Gain (IG) or mutual information between a
feature Xi and the outcome y.
• Gain Ratio is the result of dividing the information gain
by the intrinsic information of the feature, aiming to
reduce bias towards features with high information gain
value on its own rather than a good relationship with the
output variable y.
3) Random Forest importance: or contribution of its nodes,
in particular the Mean Decrease in Node Impurity (MDNI),
which measures the inequality among nodes within a Random
Forest.
For further reference of machine learning and statistical
methods for data analysis, please refer to [29].
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In the experiments, we have used the well-known R open-
source statistical software, along with a number of libraries for
machine learning and feature selection (MASS, randomForest,
kernlab and glmnet). From the original dataset, we have built
nine different subsets with different compositions. Concisely,
for each subset we vary either the amount of malware it
contains (2%, 25% or 50% of malware over the total) and
the threshold used for considering an application as malware
(1, 2 or 4 AV detectors). As an example, we shall refer to
the (1-AV, 25%) malware dataset as a dataset that contains
25% malware and 75% goodware applications where malware
is randomly selected among all applications whereby at least
1-AV detector was fired.
Each of these subsets include an amount of 50K applica-
tions, except the 50%-4AV dataset which only contains 36K
samples due to the lack of malware applications meeting the
conditions to be considered malware.
A. Predictive power of permissions
As noted in the introduction, several researchers have stud-
ied the permissions used by an application and their ability
to detect malware. For instance, the authors in [30] achieve
F1-score values in the range of 0.6 to 0.8.
In order to evaluate the effects that feature hashing has
on permissions, we try different hashing spaces (32, 64,
128, 256, 512, 1024 and 2048 hashes)to evaluate the feature
amount- performance trade off. To measure performance, we
run 10-fold cross-validation for threshold tuning in a logistic
regression algorithm and compute different AUC (Area Under
the Curve) measurements for each of the hashing spaces.
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Fig. 3
ROC CURVE FOR MALWARE DETECTION USING FEATURE HASHING ON
PERMISSIONS ONLY.
5In our case, Fig. 3 shows the ROC curve and AUC-
ROC values using logistic regression with different number
of hashes for the (4-AV, 50%) dataset. As observed, the more
hash-functions used, the higher AUC achieved in the range of
70% for 256 hashes and above, in line with [30]. In conclusion,
the permissions set alone offers a moderate approach to detect
Android malware.
In the next sections we study the remaining 26 features
(i.e. intrinsic, social and entity-related) along with 512 feature
hashes and apply feature selection techniques to identify the
most relevant ones.
B. Feature selection
Beginning at 538 features in the dataset, variable selection is
performed to reduce model complexity. Generally, larger pre-
dictor collections do not necessarily imply better performance
but larger complexity. In fact, the more predictors considered,
the easier to bump into the well-known ”Curse of dimen-
sionality”, which occurs when there is a large proportion of
predictors with respect to data, penalising global performance.
In the first experiment Fig. 4 (top), we have used the
four feature selection methods described in Section III to
evaluate the importance of each feature in the dataset. The
results show such features sorted by each selection index and
normalised with respect to the largest (names of features are
self-explanatory). The dataset under study in this experiment
was the (4-AV, 50%).
As shown in Fig. 4 (top), the top-7 most relevant features
in the dataset are, in order of importance: developerRep,
issuerRep, ageInMarket (number of days in market), lastSig-
natureUpdate, timeForCreation, lastUpdate and certVal. In
contrast, the feature hashes on the permissions are not relevant
when compared with the others.
In order to establish the number of valid features for
modeling, Fig. 4 (bottom) shows the ten-fold cross-validated
F1-score versus the number of predictors involved for each
algorithm (RF, LR and SVM), where new predictors are added
at each iteration in decreasing order of relevance. There,
Random Forest provides the highest F1-score (around 0.89),
while LR and SVM reach around 0.86 and 0.87 respectively.
Moreover, the figure shows that highest performance on any
algorithm may be achieved with only the top-15 features,
which is set as predictor threshold.
In addition, it is worth remarking that developerRep alone
achieves an F1-score above 0.8, showing that this metric alone
is more powerful than any other, such as permissions.
C. Malware detection model
We perform a full benchmark test on the 9 composed
datasets using only their top-15 features, namely: develop-
erRep, issuerRep, ageInMarket (time in market), lastSigna-
tureUpdate, timeForCreation, lastUpdate, certVal, numPerm,
numFiles, numDownloads, versionCode, oneStarRatingCont,
f216, size and meanStar. In this light, Table I shows the
training/test values of F1-score, precision and recall metrics
for each dataset and the three models under study (LR, SVM,
RF).
Malware NumDetectors F1-score Precision Recall
Logistic Regression (train/test)
2% 1 0.82/0.11 0.80/0.07 0.85/0.22
25% 1 0.89/0.62 0.93/0.61 0.85/0.63
50% 1 0.93/0.75 0.97/0.91 0.89/0.64
2% 2 0.65/0.23 0.95/0.27 0.5/0.19
25% 2 0.89/0.70 0.94/0.67 0.85/0.74
50% 2 0.94/0.83 0.98/0.9 0.90/0.76
2% 4 0.81/0.29 0.81/0.22 0.81/0.42
25% 4 0.91/0.76 0.95/0.72 0.87/0.79
50% 4 0.95/0.86 0.99/0.86 0.92/0.86
Suport Vector Machine (train/test)
2% 1 0.86/0.08 0.78/0.05 0.96/0.23
25% 1 0.92/0.67 0.91/0.62 0.93/0.71
50% 1 0.95/0.81 0.96/0.88 0.94/0.76
2% 2 0.83/0.18 0.75/0.11 0.93/0.38
25% 2 0.92/0.70 0.92/0.62 0.91/0.80
50% 2 0.95/0.85 0.97/0.89 0.93/0.81
2% 4 0.85/0.27 0.76/0.18 0.96/0.53
25% 4 0.93/0.76 0.93/0.69 0.92/0.84
50% 4 0.96/0.87 0.98/0.87 0.94/0.88
Random Forest (train/test)
2% 1 0.99/0.12 0.99/0.08 0.99/0.32
25% 1 0.99/0.73 0.99/0.70 0.99/0.76
50% 1 0.99/0.83 0.99/0.87 0.99/0.8
2% 2 0.99/0.22 0.99/0.15 0.99/0.45
25% 2 0.99/0.78 0.99/0.74 0.99/0.82
50% 2 0.99/0.87 0.99/0.89 0.99/0.85
2% 4 0.99/0.32 0.99/0.22 0.99/0.58
25% 4 0.99/0.82 0.99/0.77 0.99/0.86
50% 4 0.99/0.89 0.99/0.88 0.99/0.90
TABLE I
FULL BENCHMARK TEST WITH TOP-15 PREDICTORS.
The results show that algorithms achieve similar results,
slightly better in the case of RF. Second, it might be observed
that general performance improves as the percentage of mal-
ware samples increases, showing best results when malware
accounts for 50% of the applications. Actually, in the 2%-
malware case, the difference between train and test error
suggests that the algorithms are overfitting the data. Finally,
the algorithms perform best at identifying those malware
applications tagged by several AV engines. Clearly, when the
algorithms are trained with malware applications tagged by
two engines or more, they reach up to 0.87 F1-score in the
test set (bottom line in the table), thus providing a high-level
prediction confidence.
D. Robustness of the model
The reader must note that malware developers, after reading
this article, may decide to use different email accounts and
certificates to evade this detection mechanism. However, the
malwarish behaviour of applications is fingerprinted in sev-
eral features redundantly. On the one hand, such redundancy
implies that after 13-15 features no extra predictive power
is gained by adding new features (as shown in Fig. 4); but
on the other hand, it also provides robustness to the model
since, if some features are decided not to be used (like
developerRep and issuerRep) the others are still able to reach
good performance.
To show this, Table II shows the F1-score results of re-
running the RF algorithm to a different set of features.
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EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR FEATURE SELECTION
7F1-score Random Forest (train/test)
NDet 1-15 feats. 3-17 feats. 5-19 feats 7-21 feats 9-23 feats. 11-25 feats 13-27 feats
1 AV 0.99/0.83 0.99/0.86 0.99/0.84 0.99/0.74 0.96/0.72 0.88/0.67 0.80/0.64
2 AV 0.99/0.87 0.99/0.87 0.99/0.86 0.99/0.79 0.96/0.75 0.88/0.71 0.75/0.66
4 AV 0.99/0.89 0.99/0.88 0.99/0.87 0.99/0.80 0.96/0.77 0.89/0.73 0.77/0.69
TABLE II
F1-SCORE VALUE OF RANDOM FORESTS WITH DIFFERENT FEATURE SETS.
Essentially, the first column shows the same train/test F1-score
values as in Table I since both use the same top-15 features.
The second column shows the F1-values when training and
testing with features from 3 to 17 of Fig. 4 (i.e. top-15
without developerRep and issuerRep). As shown the F1-score
value is slightly worse than before. Similarly, when using
features 5-19, a small decrease is observed again, but still
good performance is achieved. F1-score quickly drops when
using the features from position 7 in the ranking and on.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summary, this work has shown that Google Play meta-
data provides valuable information to detect Android malware
applications, reaching F1-score values near 0.9, for example
when feeding meta-data to a Random Forest. In particular, it
has been shown that using no more than 15 features, malware
applications can be accurately identified.
Furthermore, this work has also shown that inherent fea-
tures, in particular application permissions, offer moderate
prediction power (AUC-ROC about 0.7) compared to other
metadata, such as the developer’s reputation (percentage of
malware applications uploaded by the same developer in the
past) or certificate issuer reputation. This allows constructing
efficient classification models for the early detection of mal-
ware applications uploaded at an Android market, as a prior
step to more sophisticated techniques, namely code inspection
or sandboxing.
The results of this works enable the use of simple static
analysis at once for large amounts of Android applications. For
apps uploaded to an application market, it might be determined
whether it needs further inspection or it is suitable for direct
upload. In addition, it is also possible to develop an in-
device system which informs users about the appearance of
each application and the risk of installing them in the device
beforehand.
In a nutshell, the contributions of this work are the follow-
ing:
• We evaluated the capabilities of permission-based detec-
tion approaches and their limitations by means of the
hashing trick as feature reduction technique.
• We showed that inherent application features, such as
the developer’s reputation (percentage of malware appli-
cations uploaded by the same developer in the past) or
certificate issuer’s reputation offer very good performance
for detecting Android malware.
• We proposed a model for Android Malware detection
based on meta-data and machine learning techniques
capable of detecting most Android threats, which can be
leveraged both at market level and in-device application
analysis.
• We evaluated our proposed model over different bench-
marking tests for performance and robustness of the
algorithm
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